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A B S T R AC T . Writing the history of historiography is a tricky business. There is no unbiased way of
doing it, and it can serve different goals that at best complement and at worst contradict each other.
The genre can seem both suitable to promote one’s own academic agenda and to reﬂect upon one’s
own ideological constraints, epistemological presumptions, and social aspirations. This article
analyses the motivations and methods of recent authors in the ﬁeld, and it does so principally by
focusing on the roles they attribute to historians past and present. To enable comparisons, the article
includes works with a national, European and global framework, on early modern and late modern
historiography, by intellectual, cultural and post-colonialist historians. A general conclusion will be
that while most publications use the genre to pursue academic interests with epistemic arguments, only
few try to exploit its potential for critical self-reﬂexion. As a consequence, they tend to be of limited
credibility and originality when it comes to describing historiography’s functions and historians’ roles.
This article does not treat their lack of critical commitment as an isolated phenomenon in a
historiographical sub-ﬁeld, but as a symptom of a larger problem within academic scholarship today.
There are, however, exceptions to the rule, and this article will also try to work out their particular
strengths.
In the early days of book reviewing, critics were busy looking for a solution to
a problem that the new genre brought with it: how to expose published
errors without soiling their authors’ name. Pierre Bayle, one of the foremost
participants in this discussion, proposed to deal with reviewed works according
to the ‘class’ their authors occupied within the ‘Republic of Letters’. In ,
when he announced his project of a dictionary, intended as a dumping ground
for published blunders, he recommended a gentle treatment of ‘poor
authors whom one would have quickly stripped to the shirt’ and called for an
uncompromising exposure of the errors committed by ‘the greatest and most
famous authors’. Bayle’s reasoning was twofold. Faults and mistakes by
renowned men of letters, he argued, were ‘inﬁnitely more contagious than
those of ordinary writers’; at the same time, these famous authors had such
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‘great resources of reputation and sources of glory so abundant that a hundred
wreckages could not incommode them’. Thus, blunt criticism should be seen
as a ‘sign of the high opinion’ the critic held of an author.
It would be an exaggeration to say that Bayle’s advice has left a big imprint on
the history of book reviewing, especially in academia. The modern academic
culture may have preserved more of the unwritten code of noble honour than
of the written laws of the ‘Republic of Letters’, and so academic reviewers tend
to treat each other gently and reserve their stripping energy for intellectuals
working outside the ivory tower. Wrecking a renowned professor a hundred
times (and see him resurface again) is usually not considered a healthy process,
not for the criticized and even less for the critic. This may be one reason why
academic book reviewing is not counted among the most exciting of literary
genres. It does not, however, have to be so. All authors discussed in this
review article belong to the ‘class’ of established academic scholars. They are
professors; they look back on decades of personal research; they call several
monographs their own. The youngest are in their ﬁfties, the oldest is in his
nineties. If we follow Bayle’s rules, they can afford a candid appraisal of their
publications. But can the reviewer? I believe he can, on one condition: he
should ﬁrst lay himself bare.
To put this less metaphorically, Bayle left out one decisive factor of scholarly
criticism when he assumed that established authors needed particular critical
scrutiny: namely, the degree of self-exposure of the critic. If a critic hides
behind a rhetorical curtain of impartiality in pronouncing judgement, the
communication is as asymmetrical as can be. Criticism, under such circum-
stances, cannot even come close to Bayle’s ideal of a purely truth-driven exercise
in wiping out errors, even if it is brought forward in the most sober of tones. The
imbalance of power is too large, and the victim is too defenceless, whatever their
standing may be. The best antidote is a critic’s acknowledgement of their biases
and dependencies to underscore the relative nature of their arguments. This is
what I will do in the following paragraphs.
I belong to a younger generation of historians than the authors under review,
and my reputational armour is thinner than theirs. My academic coming of age
was already characterized by what is called ‘the crisis of the humanities’, which
to many in the ﬁeld just seemed to be a crisis of ofﬁcial support. From my junior
position, I was under the impression that this crisis was partly self-inﬂicted by a
professorial class that had grown up in the humanities-friendly climate of the
Cold War, which tended to cultivate a self-sufﬁciency mistaken for autonomy,
preferred mutual cosseting to mutual criticizing, and, when the going got
tough, either switched to nostalgic mode or to servile imitation of the sciences
or to both. The unresolved problem of my position is that I feel opposed to this
class culture while simultaneously working to become part of it, based on the
unrealistic hope that acquiring the role of an ‘established outsider’ would
 Pierre Bayle, Projet et fragmens d’un dictionaire critique (Rotterdam, ), unpag.
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enable me to criticize the current academic culture more effectively. Probably,
it will just allow me to have it both ways by being an outsider to insiders and an
insider to outsiders. In any event, readers may be warned of a generational bias
inﬂuencing my judgement of the authors under review.
There are two more biases to declare. The ﬁrst concerns Cantabrigian over-
representation. The majority of books discussed here are either written by
Cambridge scholars or published by Cambridge University Press. One reason
for this is that I am writing for a Cambridge journal to which many local scholars
send in their works, and another reason is that I myself was a research fellow at
Cambridge when I agreed to write this article, which may have inﬂuenced my
choice of books. I was careful, though, not to include works by patrons of mine
or other local people to whom I owe a great deal of gratitude. And I was careful,
too, not to judge anybody I know personally by favourable (or unfavourable)
terms. Only the readers will be able to decide if I was successful in doing so.
The last bias is of particular signiﬁcance with regard to my criticism of global
histories of historiography: it is my own specialization in early modern French,
German, and British history. My interest in this particular region at this
particular time is based on the conviction that they were, for better and worse,
momentous in shaping the world we live in now. This conviction may partly
explain the ideological reservations I have against those post-colonialist scholars
who attempt to delegitimize European culture morally by provincializing
Europe historically.
My selection of books was partly made with regard to a question directly
connected with my remarks on academic reviewing and the state of the
humanities. The question is: how was and is the writing of historiography
characterized by the public role and self-perception of history writers? This
question will be asked both with respect to the books’ contents and to the
books’ authors and will thus enable some reﬂections on historiography and
historians both past and present.
I
‘Study the historian before you begin to study the facts’ is probably the most
quoted (and misquoted) sentence from E. H. Carr’s  classic What is
history? Today, Carr’s clariﬁcation of what it meant to ‘study the historian’
unintentionally conﬁrms the validity of his own phrase, for it now looks in
keeping with Carr’s historical role as an established outsider and notorious
agent provocateur in the British Cold War culture. In Carr’s eyes, the study of
the historian mainly consisted of identifying his (there was no scholarly ‘her’
on his radar) political convictions and analysing the degree to which these
convictions were determined by the political circumstances of his time.
Consequently, Carr classiﬁed modern historians ﬁrst and foremost as either
 E. H. Carr, What is history? (Houndsmills, ), p. .
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liberals or conservatives or communists. At the same time, he insisted that
quality needed a degree of eccentricity. Cross-breeding zoological metaphors,
he maintained that a historian without bees buzzing ‘in his bonnet’ had to be
a ‘dull dog’. One could regard this as an inverted self-portrait of the upper-
middle-class diplomat-cum-don with communist sympathies.
Carr’s book was the fruit of his Trevelyan lectures at Cambridge University
given in . When, forty-four years later, Anthony Grafton had the honour of
delivering another sequence of these lectures, he chose the title What was
history? The change of tense is programmatic. Grafton aims to answer Carr’s
question from the perspective of early modern historians and, on top of that, to
historicize some of Carr’s leading arguments. Early in the volume, he credits
two of his heroes, Jean Le Clerc (–) and Jacob Perizonius (–
), for not needing ‘Carr to explain to them the principles . . . that “you
cannot fully understand or appreciate the work of the historian unless you
have ﬁrst grasped the standpoint from which he himself approached it” ’
(p. ). Further on in the book, Grafton conﬁrms the validity and denies the
originality of Carr’s ‘homely analogy, that the best historians were an eccentric
breed’; his examples of ‘method and madness’ in the early modern artes
historicae include the deconstructivist antiquarian Francesco Patrizi (–),
the imaginative genealogist Reiner Reineck (–), and the historiogra-
phical iconoclast Jean Bodin (–). The reference to Carr thus comes with
some reservation about the relevance of his work.
On the whole, though, Grafton’s engagement with Carr is limited as his book
is not directed against a certain theory of history, but, at least in its ﬁrst part,
against a certain history of historiography which has been most popular in
Germany. Its proponents believe that historical scholarship, as we know it
today, was created in the early nineteenth century by German historians, who
systematically introduced archival studies, textual criticism, and a relativistic
approach to the past. Grafton picks out Ulrich Muhlack, who maintained that
while the purpose of early modern historiography had been to give lessons on
life (historia magistra vitae), modern Rankean history aimed at reconstructing
the past as it actually was (wie es eigentlich gewesen) (p. ).
Grafton provides ample material to question this juxtaposition, especially in
his discussion of Le Clerc and Perizonius. Le Clerc had already detached the
study of history from the art of rhetoric by deﬁning it as a critical examination of
sources which, if proven credible, had to be presented to the reader in plain
prose (p. ). For the same reason, he rejected ﬁctional speeches accredited
 Ibid., p. .
 Anthony Grafton, What was history? The art of history in early modern Europe (Cambridge,
).
 Ulrich Muhlack, Geschichtswissenschaft im Humanismus und in der Aufklärung: Die Vorgeschichte
des Historismus (Munich, ). Unfortunately, the footnotes are not very precise in Grafton’s
current book, which is why I was unable to verify the precise passage by Muhlack that Grafton is
referring to.
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to real ﬁgures in historical writing. His repositioning of the historian from the
ﬁeld of political instruction to that of scholarly criticism was inspired by
similar ideas to Bayle on promoting literary reviews: the understanding of
scholarship as an autonomous search for truth, conducted within the
independent ‘Republic of Letters’, and the belief in philological evidence as a
means to reduce the amount – and aggressiveness – of scholarly controversies.
It was not without irony that Le Clerc’s critical stance sparked a ﬁerce debate
with Perizonius, who was indignant at the harsh censure of the Roman historian
Quintus Curtius Rufus, whom Le Clerc found guilty of inaccurate geography,
false chronology, and fake oratory. Perizonius acted as a conservative
revolutionary. He deemed it (in his own words) ‘completely idiotic’ to ‘pass
judgement on ancient matters from the standpoint of their own time and its
customs’ (p. ). This is a condemnation of anachronism in all but name.
Perizonius also explained secularly what Leopold von Ranke would express
religiously  years later: ‘Each people, and each period in the history of a
given people, has its own customs’. Ranke condensed this into ‘every epoch is
immediate to God’. From this perspective, the transformative function of
Ranke and his followers is mostly reduced to the exploitation and adoration
of the archive as the place where an unmediated past awaited the historian.
Kasper Risbjerg Eskildsen recently spoke of ‘Ranke’s archival turn’, and here,
for once, the fashionable word ‘turn’may be appropriate. Archival studies were
not newly introduced by German historicists, but rather newly charged as an
indispensable condition for history’s accuracy and historians’ credibility.
Le Clerc and Perizonius appear at the beginning of the book, but their
dispute marks the end of Grafton’s main narrative. From the second chapter
onwards, he presents the history of the artes historicae in a literary portrait series
of authors from the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Particular
attention is given to the French antiquarian and jurist François Baudouin
(–), whose works indicate, among other things, the intertwined
relationship between historical and legal studies, in both method and content.
Baudouin compared ancient texts to legal testimonies and deﬁned a rule
that created a hierarchy of priorities concerning historians and histories: ‘one
should believe witnesses, not witnessings’ (p. ). Contrary to Carr, though,
Baudouin believed in an unbiased reconstruction of the past through the
attribution of credibility to the right authors (Cicero, for instance). The legal
imagery thus had profound implications for his perception of history.
Based on Baudouin’s works, Grafton gives an ornate deﬁnition of the ars
historica as ‘an intellectual crossroads laid out on coordinates drawn from both
the humanistic and the legal traditions’ and describes its function as ‘giving
multiple methods and practices a place to meet, as antiquarianism intersected
 Leopold von Ranke, Über die Epochen der Neueren Geschichte (; Munich, ), pp. , .
 Kasper Risbjerg Eskildsen, ‘Leopold Ranke’s archival turn: location and evidence in
modern historiography’, Modern Intellectual History,  (), pp. –.
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with ecclesiastical history, both collided with law, and all of them in turn
experienced the shock of the new as travellers described unknown worlds to the
east and, even more surprising, to the west’ (p. ). Grafton’s speciﬁcation
(if this is the right word) corresponds with his general picture of the ars historica,
which is broad, colourful, and slightly blurred. If one follows his observations
on Baudouin and Bodin, Poggio and Patrizi, Lipsius and Vossius, it becomes
increasingly hard to grasp what kind of ‘art’ they were championing precisely.
Was it a set of didactic rules in the tradition of the classical ars rhetorica and
ars poetica? Or just various things that were more or less accidentally lumped
together under one heading over time?
Grafton seems to opt for the former, but his material rather suggests the
latter. Occasionally, he calls the ars historica a ‘genre’ (the title of chapter  is
‘Death of a genre’). At the same time, his own use of the term covers types of
texts as different as disputations, orations, dialogues, and commentaries, and
only a few of them were explicitly assigned to the ars historica by their authors.
Based on the variety of textual forms and content, Donald Kelley, in an essay
written in  on Baudouin, concluded that it ‘makes more sense to treat the
ars historica as a complex of rhetorical topoi than as a literary genre’.
The fact that the term came to represent such a diversiﬁed body of writings
may be due to one single publication, which does appear in Grafton’s book, but
not as prominently as one might expect (pp. –). In , Johann Wolf
edited a collection of eighteen texts by as many authors in the Basle printing
house of Pietro Perna. The title was Artis historicae penus – ‘Treasury of the art of
history’. It assembled works by Catholic, Protestant, and nonconformist authors
from Italy, France, Germany, and Switzerland plus two ancient Greek historians.
The edition stimulated further studies on the philological reconstruction and
rhetorical presentation of the past, of which some were labelled under the
heading ars historica. Apparently, it also challenged confessional hardliners.
In the copy of the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek at Munich (available online
courtesy of Google), the Protestant authors Chytraeus, Grynaeus, and Zwinger
are crossed out in the table of contents, and there are occasional marks of
censorship in both volumes. Such signs indicate that there must have been
various sorts of ‘critical’ reading associated with the ars historica.
The writers of artes historicae are presented by Grafton as a cosmopolitan ﬂock
of independent-minded scholars on a pedagogical mission. It was their
ambition to ‘persuade the young man bound for academic or for public life
that the vital facts of history did not, in Carr’s words, resemble ﬁsh laid out on a
ﬁshmonger’s lab, but ﬁsh swimming in the ocean’ (p. ). The book hardly
clariﬁes, though, whether the political leaders of yesterday’s tomorrow actually
saw the ﬁsh, let alone if they tried to swim like them. Most of the texts were
written in Latin and thus not easily accessible to lay students. So was the ars
 Donald R. Kelley, ‘François Baudouin and his conception of history’, Journal of the History of
Ideas,  (), p. .
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historica propagated as an ‘applied science’, but practised largely as ‘l’art pour
l’art’? Grafton would deny it. According to him, the ars historica was a double-
edged sword for rulers. It promised to teach them lessons of the past for future
use, and it threatened to put them under critical scrutiny. His book recounts the
story of Emperor Maximilian I, who was eager to equip his young dynasty
with an old lineage and proud enough to think that what was good for Roman
emperors would be sufﬁcient for him: he, too, must be(come) a Trojan. His
only fear was ‘to become a credulous laughing stock in an age of criticism’ and
so he followed his own genealogists’ work with impatient interest (p. ).
On closer look, this example is not very telling or telling for other reasons.
The story is based on a report by the late sixteenth-century genealogist Reiner
Reineck, which in turn is based on a report by Maximilian’s humanist courtier
Johannes Cuspinian, who allegedly claimed to have listened to a conversation
between the emperor and another court scholar. The history of transmission is
suspect, and there are further reasons to be sceptical. Renaissance humanists
notoriously convinced one another of their own political importance, probably
to compensate for their lack of status security in comparison with jurists and
theologians. Maximilian, from what we have learned, was hardly bothered about
being perceived as credulous by scholars. He was obsessed with his genealogical
projects; he was adamant to have them fulﬁlled by his scholarly clients
according to his own adventurous plans, and he was indifferent to those
humanist historians, who, partly for nationalist, partly for evidential reasons,
criticized him for posing as Troianus instead of accepting himself as Germanus.
More revealing is the example of Joseph Scaliger, whose working conditions
at Leiden look like a late modern academic’s daydream. Scaliger received the
highest salary ‘not only in the university, but in the city of Leiden itself ’, had no
teaching obligations and a university library devoted to the latest books and
tools for historians (p. ). His standing, though, was as remarkable as it was
exceptional for early modern philologists. A possible explanation as to why
Scaliger was so generously paid and carefully looked after is given by Grafton in
another publication, where he refers to Scaliger as a highly respected ‘expert on
chronology’. Indeed, chronology may have been key to the political impact of
historical studies as it promised to give special ammunition to participants in
religious and political disputes that involved alternative datings of historical
events. As such, chronology could be particularly attractive to legal scholars in
political service and polemical spirit, i.e. the Baudouins and Bodins. As Grafton
rightly points out (p. ), proximity to law was, in terms of reputation and
remuneration, generally a good prospect for a ﬁeld of scholarship in the early
modern period, especially if it was not long-established, such as the ars historica.
 See Caspar Hirschi, The origins of nationalism: an alternative history from ancient Rome to early
modern Germany (Cambridge, ), pp. –.
 Anthony Grafton, ‘A sketch map of a lost continent: the Republic of Letters’, in idem,
Worlds made by words: scholarship and community in the modern west (Cambridge, MA, ), p. .
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If so, the critical potential of historians did not so much derive from a position
of high independence, but from a process of smooth adaptation, and its
development served the interests of patrons and parties rather than following
an agenda of independent scholarship. In short, contrary to their own self-
image, advocates of the ars historica may have delivered more propaganda
fodder than political lessons to those in charge. Although Grafton does not
draw such a conclusion, some of the witnesses he cites to document the decline
of the ars historica in the second half of the seventeenth century could support
it. The generation of Le Clerc and Perizonius, in their repudiation of ars
historica, accentuated the critical purpose of historiography while questioning
the epistemic power of historians to produce political prescriptions.
In general, Grafton’s analytical toolkit is not ideally equipped to offer insights
into possible discrepancies between the roles early modern history writers
ascribed to themselves and the functions they were designated by others. Like
many other intellectual historians, he perceives them primarily as citizens of
the ‘Republic of Letters’. The term, as we have seen in Bayle’s quotation, was
introduced by early modern scholars, which is why many historians today feel
comfortable with it. Yet does a widely used historical category necessarily make
a good analytical category? Not in this case. Twenty years ago, Pierre Bourdieu
attributed the Republic of Letters to the vocabulary of ‘spontaneous sociology’,
because it lacked a ‘worked-out concept’ and therefore could not serve as an
analysis of the ‘functioning of the literary world’. I do not think that the
problem with the ‘Republic of Letters’ has much to do with ‘spontaneous
sociology’. Yet I believe that it encourages one to ignore the fundamental
differences between the organization of scholarly relations and political
communities. It creates a sense of scholarly self-determination, which is at
odds with the structural conditions of learned cultures both then and now. Early
modern scholars, when projecting themselves into the Republic of Letters, had
to blind out their susceptibility to censorship and court culture and hide their
dependences on patrons, printers, and publishers. The term also helped to
conceal the interdependence of scholarly interests, political convictions, and
religious beliefs. Similar to other powerful metaphors such as ‘free market’ or
‘war on terror’, the term ‘Republic of Letters’ distorted the reality in order to
reshape it. This makes it highly interesting as a historical category, but hardly
helpful as an analytical one.
Grafton’s use of the phrase is symptomatic. Instead of clarifying its
metaphorical meaning, he adds further imagery that does not necessarily
clarify the picture. The book begins with the following sentence: ‘In the years
 Pierre Bourdieu, Les regles de l’art: Gene`se et structure du champ littéraire (Paris, ), p. .
 For its signiﬁcance as a historical category, see Caspar Hirschi, ‘Piraten der
Gelehrtenrepublik: Die Norm des sachlichen Streits und ihre polemische Funktion’, in Kai
Bremer and Carlos Spoerhase, eds., Gelehrte Polemik: Typen und Techniken gelehrter Konﬂiktführung
in der respublica litteraria des . und . Jahrhunderts (Frankfurt am Main, ), pp. –.
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around , a roomy but fragile imaginary mansion housed the citizens of the
Republic of Letters.’ A few lines further down, he writes: ‘Many of those who
dwelled in this ample new house of learning feared that it was in danger of
going up in ﬂames’ (p. ). This is not the occasional accident of every lively
imagination. In another recent article, Grafton called the Republic of Letters ‘a
lost continent’, ‘a sort of Pedantic Park’, and ‘a palimpsest of people, books, and
objects in motion’. Exemplifying complex metaphors with even more
complex metaphors is a sign that they are not working. Why, then, is the
‘Republic of Letters’ such a popular concept among late modern historians?
The tone they adopt when speaking about its alleged early modern citizens is
often nostalgic, sometimes ironic, and always sympathetic. It seems that many
use the metaphor to express their own ideals of free and independent
scholarship in an international academic environment. As likeable as this is,
such a sunny view of the humanities is fundamentally at odds with the
institutional constraints within modern universities. It tends to induce a false
sense of security during periods of generous funding and to provoke loud, but
belated outcries in times of austerity.
I I
Grafton’s answer to the question ‘What was history?’ is as Eurocentric as can be.
Yet, it is so for obvious reasons, since it would be hard to argue that a genealogy
of modern academic historiography has to include extra-European traditions of
history writing. Markus Völkel, a European early modernist-turned-global
historian, goes even further. In his global history of historiography, published
in German under the title Geschichtsschreibung, he states:
The European method of scientiﬁc history, despite being heavily criticized in, for
instance, Africa and India, has since conquered almost all academic institutions of
the world. This method has been denounced as imperialist, but at the same time it
has always been used to construct the national histories of new nations.
Völkel labels his own approach to the global history of historiography ‘mild
Eurocentrism’ and justiﬁes it both methodologically and historically: ‘As long as
the rejection of “Eurocentrism” remains a methodological project by Western
educated elites, the new “decentred global history” will not be able to abandon
Europe as a point of reference for its historiographical method’ (pp. –). At
the present stage, according to Völkel, global history has to deny itself entirely if
it wants to abandon its Eurocentric structure (p. ).
If this is so, why does a history of historiography have to include all those
extra-European traditions of history writing which even most of today’s global
 Grafton, ‘A sketch map’, pp. , , .
 Markus Völkel, Geschichtsschreibung: Eine Einführung in globaler Perspektive (Cologne, ),
p. .
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historians treat as methodological dead ends? Völkel does not address this point
directly, but indicates that he considers a global approach the most appropriate
way to historicize the history of historiography more thoroughly. The main
question for him is not where present forms of academic scholarship originated
and how they evolved, but how history was translated, narrated, and
manipulated in different times and places. Neither is he very interested in
cross-cultural exchanges, or what global historians call ‘hybridization’. With this,
Völkel’s book is not so much an exercise in provincializing, but in contextualiz-
ing Europe, which renders it appealing to more than just post-colonialist
scholars – provided that they master German.
As is often the case with global histories by a single author, Völkel’s
Geschichtsschreibung is extremely ambitious. Aside from four chapters on Western
Europe from early antiquity to late modernity, it includes single chapters on
Byzantine, Arabic, Indian, Chinese, Japanese, and American historical
traditions and closes with a few pages on African historiography. All chapters
are based on the same set of questions addressing the scope of information,
methodological techniques, institutional conditions, literary genres, and the
relationship between history writing and other practices of memory in a given
culture and period. Furthermore, Völkel draws biographical sketches of major
historians, summarizes their ‘canonical’ works, discusses secondary literature,
and even proposes new interpretations of certain developments (according to
him, for instance, the ‘ﬁrst linguistic turn’ happened around , when
Romantic historians pushed for a vernacular historiography that would breathe
the national spirit) (p. ).
The problems arising from Völkel’s Herculean tour de force have less to do with
the composition and content of this particular book than with global histories in
general. One problem is narrative or rather the lack thereof. Post-Hegelian
global histories, even if they are well-structured, such as Völkel’s (or, for that
reason, Bayly’s or Osterhammel’s), inevitably deal with material too abundant,
too disparate, and too complex to form a coherent argument, let alone tell a
comprehensible story. Writing a book that is more than the sum of its parts is
not an easy task under such conditions, whereas exhausting readers through
information overload is. In Völkel’s case, even his admirable ability to pack
complex issues into concise images (‘The Chinese tradition of knowledge
proceeded by “scissors and paste”’ (p. )) may not be enough to prevent
readers from drowning in the vast sea of his material, all the more so as the book
comes in painfully small print. The targeted student audience will only be able
to swim through small sections at a time.
Another problem speciﬁcally of single-authored global histories concerns
scholarly expertise and hence authorial credibility. All authors of global
histories enter the ﬁeld as specialists for a small part of it and will never be
experts on most of what they are writing about. Even if they master several
languages, they remain heavily dependent on second-hand knowledge and will
hardly be capable of examining its quality thoroughly. Völkel’s scholarly
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reputation is based on specialist studies of early modern papal and European
intellectual history. He concedes his limited knowledge of extra-European
histories and languages, and although he does remarkably well when describing
their historiographies, non-specialist readers will have reservations about giving
his portraits of Arab or Chinese historians the same credit as those of their
European counterparts. As long as modern historiography derives its authority
from specialist expertise and ﬁrst-hand knowledge of original documents,
global histories by single authors will be intellectual towers built on shaky
epistemological foundations.
For English-speaking readers, a valuable alternative to Völkel’s
Geschichtsschreibung is the voluminous textbook A global history of history by
Daniel Woolf. Compared to Völkel’s work, it looks more appealing at ﬁrst
sight and less consistent on closer inspection. Although it is much bigger, it feels
easier to swallow. It is designed as a state-of-the-art textbook with subject
boxes on particular topics, extracts of historiographical classics, global timelines
for each epoch, sections for further reading, and lots of illustrations. Similar
to Völkel’s book, it impresses with its well-thought-out structure, accessible
language, concise presentation of complex issues, and, on top of that, some
original interpretations, which make it interesting to professional historians,
too.
Contrary to Völkel, though, Woolf, who ﬁrst specialized in early modern
English historiography, is eager to shake off any notion of Eurocentrism. In the
introduction, he asserts that he is making a contribution to the post-colonial
project of ‘provincializing Europe’ and speciﬁes this with a quote from Dominic
Sachsenmaier:
It would be wrong to simply identify diffusion from the West to the rest as the only
force behind the genesis of academic historiography as a worldwide phenomenon.
Rather, the global spread of cultures of rationality, the modern academic system and
university-based historiography occurred in an intricate jeu d’échelles of trans-local
and local contexts, colonial power formations, liberation movements, transnational
intellectual networks and other factors.
This statement is more precise in what it rejects than what it endorses, but even
so, Woolf ’s own narrative rarely resembles Sachsenmaier’s transcultural
imagery. There are episodes of ‘interculturality’ between Islamic, Jewish, and
Christian historians during the period traditionally known as the middle ages
and relabelled ‘Age of global violence’ by Woolf, but even here the author has
to concede that ‘the impact of these contacts on the writing of history was for
now rather limited’ (p. ).
 Daniel Woolf, A global history of history (Cambridge, ).
 Dominic Sachsenmaier, ‘Global history, pluralism, and the question of traditions’, New
Global Studies,  (), p. .
H I S T O R I O G R A P H I C A L R E V I E W S
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0018246X12000337
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 07:20:23, subject to the Cambridge Core
Later, from the eighteenth century onward, the impact may have grown, but
apparently only in one direction: from Europe outwards. Woolf, in perfect
accordance with the diffusionist approach he dismissed at the beginning,
speaks of ‘the spread of Western historicity to most of the rest of the world,
sometimes by force, but often by invitation’ (p. ). He describes how ‘the
later nineteenth century would import to Japan and China a further wave of
methodological and conceptual change derived from Europe’ (p. ), and he
states that Indian historians, regardless of their political leanings, ‘mainly
looked westwards for models and methods’ (p. ). This is probably true to the
present day, even in the ﬁeld of post-colonial studies, where Asian and African
historians not only train in ‘Western’ methods, but mostly leave for the West as
soon as they get a decent offer from an American or British university. There
are still some colonial rules dictating the post-colonial game.
With Sachsenmaier’s snakes-and-ladder approach failing, Woolf follows a
diffusionist model for modern history and a comparative one for all periods
before. His comparisons are not guided by a principle of symmetry, but by the
will to highlight areas where extra-European historians were earlier or better.
The Chinese are given the most credit in this regard. Woolf claims that they
developed encyclopaedias, biographies, and historical novels long before the
Europeans even came close to imagining them (p. ). Furthermore, ‘Chinese
historians consolidated much earlier than their European counterparts a clear
and consistent set of rules and practices for the recovery and representation of
the past’ (p. ). Unfortunately, Woolf does not enumerate what these rules
and practices were, and neither does he explain why they did not help the
Chinese to compete with Western historiography in later periods. Clearly, he
does not want to introduce a ‘Needham question’ for the humanities, but then
he cannot prevent the question looming in his narrative, since all extra-
European traditions are as irrelevant in his account of modern academic
historiography as they are in Grafton’s book.
Another comparative technique used by Woolf is to ﬁnd Chinese equivalents
to great European thinkers: ‘La Popelinie`re, Bodin and Bayle each have
counterparts of sorts during the Ming, though it is rather unlikely that the
Chinese authors, despite Western contact, knew of their French opposite
numbers or vice versa’ (p. ). In a similar vein, he states that ‘if Britain had its
triumvirate of Hume, Robertson and Gibbon, eighteenth-century China could
answer back with its own distinguished trio’, called Wang Mingsheng, Qian
Daxin, and Zhao Yi (p. ). To complete the debunking of European
singularity, Woolf calls the period ‘Eurasian Enlightenment’. His terminological
and comparative undertakings have, as shallow as they are, little epistemic value,
but great ironic effect. When Woolf endows extra-European cultures with the
Enlightenment (other post-colonial scholars do the same with the Renaissance,
though hardly with the middle ages), he places himself on the shoulders of
those he wants to overthrow. He is acting as a European colonizer. It would be
interesting to see how European historians would react if they were told not to
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speak of the ‘French Enlightenment’ anymore, but of ‘French culture under
the early Qing Dynasty’, or to call early modern European barbers ‘practitioners
of Ayurveda’.
An involuntary demonstration of how the colonizing effect of post-
colonialism can be carried to the extremes is given by Jack Goody in his The
theft of history. Goody, who was born in , acquired academic fame as a
social anthropologist in the s and s and has been a Cambridge legend
ever since, decided to embark on a crusade against academic Eurocentrism in
his old age. His polemical energy is impressive, but the blows he deals too often
miss the target. By ‘theft’ of history, Goody means ‘the take-over of history by the
west’, that is, ‘the past is conceptualized and presented according to what
happened on the provincial scale of Europe, often western Europe, and then
imposed upon the rest of the world’ (p. ). Among the goods stolen in this
large-scale robbery are democracy, capitalism, freedom, individualism, univer-
sities, and romantic love. Goody’s aim is to show when the theft had taken place,
how it can be undone, and who needs to be held responsible. The theft,
according to him, began ‘with the notions of Archaic society and Antiquity,
proceeding from there in a more or less straight line through feudalism and the
Renaissance to capitalism’ (p. ). Goody returns the stolen goods by method
of semantic widening: he declares, among other things, that the bourgeoisie has
existed ‘ever since the Urban Revolution of the Bronze Age’ (p. ), that
China had introduced capitalism, mechanization, and industrialization long
before Europe (p. ) and that the organization of pirate ships was ‘often
based on “democratic” principles’, so there is ‘no sense in which the Greeks can
be said to have “discovered individual freedom” or democracy’ (p. ).
Identifying the culprits is even easier. They are to be found among those dead
old white men who wrote about European history without having the chance to
be enlightened by post-colonialism. Goody does not care to historicize the
Eurocentric views of the authors discussed because he considers them guilty by
the universal standards of his superior epistemic and moral judgement.
Interestingly, his verdicts tend to sound much harsher than his actual
disagreements. After stating that the arguments of Joseph Needham, Norbert
Elias, and Fernand Braudel ‘are ﬂawed since they either take that advantage [of
the West on the rest] back to a distant past, or also privilege later Europe in a
questionable way, so that they distort world history rather than illuminate it’,
Goody adds a footnote, saying: ‘Of course, only in certain ways; I am in complete
agreement with most of their writings’ (p. ).
Worse than that, some of his verdicts are unjust or confused or both.
‘Burkhardt in Switzerland’ is accused of ‘nationalistic ideas of the “spirit” of the
Renaissance’, including the celebration of limited democracy and ‘the triumph
of European civilisation over all others’ (p. ). If ‘Burkhardt’ is meant to be
Jacob Burckhardt (as the ‘J.’ in the index suggests), then Goody got things
 Jack Goody, The theft of history (Cambridge, ).
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wrong. The Swiss Patrician’s picture of Renaissance Italy was not so much
triumphant as ambivalent; it contrasted sharply with his view of contemporary
Switzerland as philistine and uncreative, and it never served to glorify
democracy because he hated it. In another section of the book, Goody notes
that ‘Burkhardt actually wrote of a ‘mystical marriage’ between Greece and his
own country, Germany, so that the ancients had to have everything good that
marked the moderns’ and then concludes: ‘Such claims must arouse a measure
of scepticism in a critical reader’ (p. ). Surely they must, though in more than
one way. How can ‘Burkhardt’ be a Swiss nationalist in one passage and a
German chauvinist in another? We do not know. There are no references to
Goody’s sources, and the index attributes the two passages to the same person.
Less confused, but more unjust, is Goody’s discussion of Norbert Elias. The
author of The civilising process is accused of many sins, and Goody ﬁnds it
particularly ‘unacceptable that there is no reference to other urban societies’,
which could have ‘led him to query the notion of a special “social personality
structure” in the west’ (p. ). One can criticize Elias for many things – his
fusion of Freudian Entwicklungspsychologie with Hegelian Geschichtsphilosophie,
his dependence upon the memoirs of Saint-Simon, etc. – but not for the
absence of cross-cultural comparisons. In a central chapter of the Civilising
process, he writes:
One cannot avoid comparing the direction of this civilizing-curve [concerning table
manners] with the custom long practised in China. There, as has been said, the knife
disappeared many centuries ago from use at the table. According to the feelings of
many Chinese, the manner in which Europeans eat is ‘uncivilized’. ‘The Europeans
are barbarians’, people say there now and again, ‘they eat with swords’.
The main problem underlying Goody’s cavalier treatment of Eurocentric
scholars is the lack of critical self-reﬂection. He is driven by an unwavering belief
in the superiority of post-colonial historiography, both morally and epistemo-
logically. From this standpoint, he cannot accept that, analytically, post-colonial
approaches may be working better in some subject areas (such as the history
of material culture or medical treatment) than others (such as the history
of historiography). Neither does he acknowledge that claims to European
singularity do not necessarily amount to claims to European superiority. He
thus seems to overlook the long tradition of deconstructing European
mythologies from Eurocentric points of views – a tradition that has borne richer
fruit than the more recent provincializing exercises. For instance, it has proved
more rewarding to work out how little modern Western democracy resembles its
Ancient Greek namesake than to create new historiographical myths reaching
back to off-shore democracies on non-European pirate boats. Finally, Goody
cannot see what Völkel describes so lucidly – that even the most Europhobic
 Norbert Elias, The civilizing process: sociogenetic and psychogenetic investigations (Oxford,
), p. .
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academics inevitably reproduce or even strengthen Eurocentric worldviews.
So, too, does he when framing Asian and African history with European
concepts such as capitalism, democracy, and bourgeoisie.
I I I
To ﬁnd a critical assessment of global history’s present state and situation by
a global historian, one can turn to Christopher Bayly’s ‘History and world
history’, which is the ﬁrst of sixteen thematic essays in A concise companion to
history (), edited by Ulinka Rublack. Bayly, who has contributed much to
the triumph of global history at Western universities in recent decades, criticizes
postmodernists within his ﬁeld for having ‘overplayed their hand by denoun-
cing all “grand narratives”, except their own’ (p. ), and warns his colleagues
of obscuring the history of the great divide between the West and the rest by
explaining it away ‘entirely as a “late divergence” ’ (p. ). According to him, the
divide may have become fully apparent only around , but ‘Europe’s
competitive advantages’ had revealed themselves as early as . One such
advantage, he argues, was ‘a more pervasive proto-anthropology’ developed
particularly by Churchmen in the colonies (p. ). Bayly’s assessment is all the
more interesting as he does not believe global history to be in a position of
political strength. Rather, he sees it threatened internally by the dominance of
political correctness over epistemological soundness, and externally by the
return of a distinctively nationalist historicism in research and school curricula.
One cannot deny that Bayly has a point as far as school education is concerned,
especially in Britain, where Niall Ferguson, Simon Schama, and other
professional admirers of the national past have lobbied for a return to study
great men and great battles in history teaching and found support from Tory
members of the government. However, one could also argue that these public
academics are trying to win back in the schoolhouse what they have lost in
the ivory tower. Bayly may consider his opponents to be more powerful
than they actually are – an impression that is reinforced by his challenge to the
‘Cambridge School’ of political thought with a ‘global intellectual history’.
Bayly’s essay ﬁgures under the title ‘Writing history’, together with three
other articles on ‘Causation’ (R. Bin Wong), ‘The status of historical
knowledge’ (Ulinka Rublack), and ‘Historians’ (Donald R. Kelley and Bonnie
G. Smith). Unfortunately, the last of these is a missed opportunity. Instead of
being a reﬂection on historians’ self-understanding, work ethics, social roles,
political functions and so on, Kelley and Smith offer an overview on history
writing from Herodotus to Lynn Hunt that repeatedly takes on the character of
name-dropping. Important topics such as the complicated relationship between
professional and amateur historians during the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries are touched on but not discussed. The essay ends with the elitist regret
 Ulinka Rublack, ed., A concise companion to history (Oxford, ).
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that the Internet will enable ‘the electronically adept’ to join ‘the ranks of
scholars’ and the strange expectation that it will move ‘the identity of the
historian . . . another step away from the “source” ’ (p. ). Whatever may be
meant by ‘source’, it cannot be original documents, because no other medium
has made them available in such abundance as the Internet.
The remaining dozen essays in the book are subsumed under the heading
‘Themes and structures’. Conceptually, it is a potpourri, but there are many
good pieces among them, for instance ‘Power’ by Christopher Clark (who
addresses this vast topic with an insightful mix of general observations and
telling examples), ‘Gender’ by Dorothy Ko (who outlines an intertwined history
of gender and of gender studies), and ‘Emotions’ by Eiko Ikegami (who offers a
much more nuanced criticism of Norbert Elias’s Civilising process using the not-
so-Hegelian counter-example of Japan). The common element of all
contributions is the inclusion of a global dimension or at least of a global
touch, and the common element of all contributors is their employment at
British or American universities.
A very different kind of multi-authored history of historiography is presented
in volume V of the The Oxford history of historical writing. It covers the period
from  onwards in  pages written by three dozen authors. The editors
are Axel Schneider and Daniel Woolf, and the latter’s impact can be felt in a
distinctively global framework, which for this period makes sense in every
respect. However, compared to Woolf ’s single-authored textbook, the global
approach is conventionally, not to say traditionally, organized. The ﬁrst ten
essays are devoted to speciﬁc themes or methods, which are more representa-
tive of the state of historiography in  than in  or . They include
some original and rewarding choices, such as an overview on ‘Censorship and
history’ by Antoon De Baets or a discussion of ‘The historiography of
environmental history’ by J. R. McNeill. Noticeably missing in this section are
articles on history publishing, and historiographical enquiry, which could have
shed light on the massive changes brought about by the digital revolution. More
problematic still, there is no contribution on popular and public history, which
probably had the biggest social and political impact of all history writing during
the period covered by this volume. So while the editors ﬂatten the hierarchy
between Western and non-Western historiography, they reinforce another
hierarchy no less questionable – the one between professional and popular
history.
The remaining twenty-two articles deal with historiography in one single
nation or language area, from Germany to Mexico to Korea. This organization
does not necessarily further cross-cultural perspectives on regional and global
‘entanglements’, which, during this period, were stronger than ever before. The
articles themselves provide solid to excellent introductions. Michael Bentley, in
 Axel Schneider and Daniel Woolf, eds., The Oxford dictionary of historical writing, V:Historical
writing since  (Oxford, ).
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his witty and elegantly written piece on Britain, even makes up for conceptual
omissions in the ﬁrst part of the volume. He not only includes the social and
political forces working in British history writing, but also the changes brought
to the history profession by radio, television, computer, and the Internet
(pp. –).
I V
Writing about the recent historiography of one’s own nation can hardly be done
in a neutral tone. Bentley takes a critical stance, especially towards a
historiographical species well adapted to British upper-middle-class culture:
the theory-averse storyteller. In contrast, the tone chosen by the two historians
to be discussed now is congratulatory, not to say self-congratulatory. There is
nothing wrong with this as long as authors do not confuse beating their breasts
with unbiased scholarship or try to make their readers confuse the two. The
authors in question are not free from suspicion in this regard.
André Burguie`re was thirty years old when he was elected ‘secrétaire de
redaction’ of the legendary journal Annales in . Twelve years later, he
became a senior member of the editorial board, where he has remained until
the present day. This information is given in Timothy Tackett’s instructive
foreword to the translation of Burguie`re’s history of The Annales School,
originally published in , and it is also given by Burguie`re himself in his
introduction, together with an explanation as to why he undertook writing a
history he was himself involved in and is still part of. The explanation itself is
not entirely convincing as it boils down to a ritualistic, but inconsistent, display
of intellectual self-effacement and methodical discipline. Burguie`re argues that
as an insider he is no more or less qualiﬁed than an outsider to write this history
because he knows ‘how to step back and respect certain objectiﬁcation
procedures’ (p. ). This means, more precisely, not to include himself in the
story, a decision he also justiﬁes biographically, using an image familiar to most
history students: ‘Medieval clerics had the impression, in reading classical
authors, that they were dwarfs perched on the shoulders of giants. Similarly,
I will not conceal my continuing fondness and admiration for these elders
in whose shadow I learned to love history’ (p. ). The medieval metaphor
serves a modern method here: you blank yourself out of the picture to satisfy
quasi-formal requirements of objectivity in order to pay homage to your
historiographical forefathers. Self-explanation can be a sophisticated form
of self-concealment.
Burguie`re would have brought less trouble upon himself (more on that
below) had he presented the book as what it is: an exemplary piece of memory
politics. It is based on the conviction that the ‘histoire scientiﬁque’, introduced
by Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre in the s, ‘has not been superseded’, but
 André Burguie`re, The Annales school: an intellectual history (Ithaca, NY, ).
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only asks ‘to be reborn’ (pp. –), and it is driven by the motivation to prepare
this rebirth along the lines of his own research philosophy, which is, in a
nutshell, historical anthropology operating on the mystical category mentalités.
Thus, Burguie`re’s own role as curator of the intellectual heritage bequeathed
by the founding fathers of the Annales is afforded a higher status in this book.
Fittingly, it starts and ends with the anecdote about an American historian at
an international conference, who aggressively expressed her astonishment
at the ‘obsession among the Annales school historians’ to cite the review’s
founders at every turn (p. ).
Burguie`re’s memory politics result in a story that begins with two differing
equals, Febvre and Bloch, who created the ‘spirit of the Annales’ in a
collaborative effort full of heated exchanges, declarations of friendship, and
bursts of originality. It then turns to their powerful successors in the post-war
period, who superseded the founders’ legacy with problematic methodological
concepts and research practices. Most damaging of all, in Burguie`re’s eyes, was
Ernest Labrousse, with his attempt to replace the informal co-operation of
international scholars with the formal co-ordination of national Ph.D.-cohorts,
to favour socio-economic quantiﬁcation to anthropological interpretation and
to weaken the enquiry of mentalités by giving in to ‘determinist temptation’
(p. ).
Compared to Labrousse, Fernand Braudel is presented as a rather minor
ﬁgure (also in terms of damage done), which is a bold assessment considering
the standing attributed to him in most other studies of the Annales School.
Burguie`re describes histoire totale, a concept introduced by Febvre but mostly
associated with Braudel, as a ‘monstrous and ridiculous chimera’, and he seems
to consider Braudel’s greatest contribution to the Annales School as having
shown Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie a way out of the Labroussian army (pp. –
). Ladurie indeed emerges as the true heir to Bloch and Febvre by
transforming the study of mentalities into historical anthropology. The ﬁnal
part of the book then turns into a lengthy review article of more recent works,
including a subchapter entitled ‘Passing of the Comet’, which offers Foucault
posthumously a place within the Annales School, though not without criticizing
him for ignoring the concept of mentality (p. ).
What brought Burguie`re into trouble was the decision to limit his history to
France. Given the book’s principal purpose, to serve memory politics, this was a
reasonable choice. Yet again, Burguie`re was unable to justify himself. He half-
apologized for failing ‘the founders of the Annales’, who had denounced ‘the
Gallocentrism of French historians’, and half-explained the decision away by his
‘greater familiarity with French studies’ (p. ). The trouble came in the form of
a long and somewhat autobiographical review in the London Review of Books that
spared no effort to strip the French historian to his shirt. Its author is Richard
Evans, and its main theme is the historiographical virtue of internationalism.
 Richard Evans, ‘Cite ourselves!’, London Review of Books,  ( Dec. ), pp. –.
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Burguie`re does not ﬁgure prominently in Evans’s review and neither does his
book. Evans starts with a recollection of his own youthful self being passionate
about international scholarship in general and the Annales School in
particular. The bulk of the review consists of a different history of the Annales,
largely drawn from Lutz Raphael’s Die Erben von Bloch und Febvre of .
Evans highlights Febvre’s cynical manoeuvres to turn his heresy into the new
orthodoxy while continuing to sell it as heresy. He also argues that Braudel’s
pupils narrowed the international outlook and character of the movement to a
hexagonal affair. This is where Burguie`re comes into play. Evans introduces him
as a hopeless case of national narrowness, which may not be entirely wrong, but
he does it in a way that is not entirely correct. Burguie`re, in his clumsy apologia,
writes: ‘At a time when international scientiﬁc organizations and events . . . seem
to be globalizing historical research to the same extent as is seen in the
experimental and exact sciences, it is troubling to observe that most historical
debate continues to unfold within a national framework’ (p. ). Evans renders
this as follows: ‘Burguie`re writes that he has conﬁned his book to French
historians, mainly because “most historical debate continues to unfold within
a national framework”.’ And when Burguie`re meditates: ‘By virtue of its
international success, microhistoria, launched by Italian historians . . . close to the
Annales school, may belie the idea of a national isolation of historiographical
issues and trajectories’ (p. ), Evans concludes: ‘He believes there has always
been, and continues to be, a “national isolation of historiographical issues and
trajectories”.’
This exercise in the ﬁne art of misquoting ﬁnds a match at the end of the
review, where Evans uses a sledgehammer to crack a nut by ﬁrst suspecting
Burguie`re of not having read Raphael’s study and then qualifying his book as
‘self-important, pompous, pretentious, solipsistic, often obscure, sometimes
barely coherent’. One cannot help thinking that there may be some nationalist
undertones in this internationalist bashing. Poor Burguie`re published a riposte
entitled Déconstruction d’une démolition ﬁve months later, thereby giving another
impression of his provincial horizon, as it was not a reaction to Evans’s review,
but rather to an appreciative account of it in a French journal. Preoccupied
with damage limitation, Burguie`re did not dare return the compliment of a
nationalist attitude to his critic, although it would not have been too difﬁcult to
do so, considering that Evans borrowed a few arguments of the review from
his own book, which he had published a few months before and in which he
praised the internationalism of British historians.
 Lutz Raphael, Die Erben von Bloch und Febvre: Annales-Geschichtsschreibung und nouvelle
histoire in Frankreich – (Stuttgart, ).
 André Burguie`re, ‘Déconstruction d’une démolition’, Books, May : www.booksmag.
fr/blog/droit-de-reponse-dandre-burguiere-; ‘Les historiens français refont leur histoire’,
Books,  Feb. : www.booksmag.fr/focus/les-historiens-francais-refont-leur-histoire-/
recherche/area=europe.
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Cosmopolitan islanders, as its title reads, is an extended version of Evans’s
inaugural lecture as Regius Professor of Modern History at Cambridge.
According to the nature of the event, it is a celebratory account of his discipline,
British historiography of the European continent. What makes the eulogy
special is that it comes by means of statistical data on historians working
on nations other than their own. Evans selected Britain, the United States,
Germany, France, and Italy and came to the conclusion that US historians are
the most ‘cosmopolitan’, with  per cent working on foreign topics, followed
by the British, the French, the Germans, and the Italians, with only  per cent
studying non-Italian history. The conclusion is premature. The ﬁgures
collected by Evans’s research assistants are, with the exception of Britain and
Germany, hardly representative of the whole guild of academic historians within
each country and, on top of that, they amount to a comparison of apples and
pears. For France and Italy, only two history departments in each country have
been included, of which none is situated at the École normale supérieur or the
Scuola normale superiore. For the United States, in contrast, the data is taken
exclusively from seven of the greatest private universities plus Berkeley. It would
not be too bold an assumption that the number would drop dramatically from
 per cent with the thousands of public US institutions included. The only
argument Evans can make on ﬁrm ground is that there are more historians
studying foreign countries at British than at German universities. Whether
this is a sign of greater British cosmopolitanism is yet another question. One can
also write the history of foreign countries for the purpose of national
celebration, a motive that has a particularly great tradition in Britain.
A second argument brought forward by Evans for British historians’
cosmopolitanism and, ultimately, superiority, is the impact they have on foreign
countries’ national historiography, as reﬂected in the great number of
translations and sales of their books abroad. This is a stronger, but still not
entirely convincing point. It is indeed striking how well British historians are
generally received on the continent, and it would be hard to argue that this has
nothing to do with elegant writing and interesting arguments. But why are they
interesting? In some countries, especially in Germany, British historians seem to
walk through the political mineﬁeld that the more recent national history still
is for domestic scholars. They are thus more inclined to move in directions
where locals would not dare go and tend to be warmly welcomed by them when
 Richard Evans, Cosmopolitan islanders: British historians and the European Continent
(Cambridge, ).
 For another critical assessment of Evans’s data based on different statistical material see
Peter Baldwin, ‘Smug Britannia: the dominance of (the) English in current history writing and
its pathologies’, Contemporary European History,  (), pp. –.
 The most complete comparative data on British and German history publishing after
 is now available in Olaf Blaschke, Verleger machen Geschichte: Buchhandel und Historiker seit
 im deutsch-britischen Vergleich (Göttingen, ). As far as I can see, though, Blaschke does
not provide quantitative information about publications on foreign topics.
 H I S TO R I C A L J O U R N A L
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0018246X12000337
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 07:20:23, subject to the Cambridge Core
returning unscathed. Christopher Clark’s revisionist history of Prussia, Iron
kingdom, is a recent example of this. Evans rightly points out that one reason
for British historians’ popularity abroad is – ‘France aside’ – the openness of
foreign historians to foreign ideas (p. ).
In order to turn this success story into an argument for the general
superiority of British history writing, Evans makes an opposite claim, and this is
where his argument falters. He observes that continental historians are little
read in Britain, let alone translated into English, and ascribes this to a lack of
quality and readability. His judgement on German historians is short and clear:
they
have no incentive to write for anyone apart from each other and a captive readership
of students taking their courses, and strive to make their reputations with the longest
books, the longest sentences and the longest footnotes; British publishers look
at their work with horror as unreadable and unmarketable, and seldom translate
it. (p. )
As with most national stereotyping, this statement may contain a grain of truth,
but does not explain very much. What about British historians working on
Britain? Could it be that they cultivate more insular reading habits for the
simple reason that many of them are not as familiar with French, German, and
Italian as their continental counterparts are with English? And what about the
low number of German novelists being translated into English? Do we have to
make their long footnotes and bad writing responsible, too, or could this have
more to do with hegemonic complacency on the side of British and American
publishers and publics? Questions about historians can hardly be answered by
looking at historians alone, but then their successes or failures could no longer
be presented as a direct result of personal virtues or vices. Evans, in his
extended inaugural lecture, understandably has little inclination to succumb to
such sobering thoughts.
Much of Cosmopolitan islanders consists of quotes taken from emails of friends
and colleagues speaking about their –mostly successful – reception abroad, and
of vignettes of previous Regius professors and their works on continental
history. This makes for a read not unlike Burguie`re’s book, except that the
Frenchman’s heroes appear more fascinating in many ways than a Temperley,
Taylor, or Trevelyan. One has to wait till the last chapter to reach the best part
of the book, where Evans speaks about the prospects of British historians’
engagement with the continent. Having written the book before the British
government announced drastic university reforms, Evans locates the biggest
threat as being ‘the rapid and continuing decline of language-learning’ in
British schools (p. ). This, according to him, leads to fewer young historians
being capable of studying foreign sources in their original language, an effect
reinforced by the little time Ph.D. students have to improve their foreign-
language skills because of government requirements to complete their studies
within three to four years (p. ). For the generation of younger historians
H I S T O R I O G R A P H I C A L R E V I E W S
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0018246X12000337
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 07:20:23, subject to the Cambridge Core
now ﬁlling new posts at British universities, Evans is already seeing his
countrymen being gradually replaced by continentals, most of them Germans.
So, will the reﬁned species of Cosmopolitan islanders be succeeded by Teutonic
language-torturers and footnote fetishists? Not necessarily, Evans reassures his
readers, as long as many of the newly employed German historians have already
taken their undergraduate and postgraduate studies in Britain and thus had
the chance to adapt to ‘the British tradition of writing for a broad readership
in a literary style’ (p. ). With student fees skyrocketing in Britain and the
overproduction of academics reaching unprecedented heights in Germany, this
may soon turn out to be a pious hope.
V
Perhaps, though, that great tradition of British historians feeding the literary
market with beautiful prose is less dependent on university education than
Evans believes. What could, in fact, be more important is the relationship
between academic and non-academic history writers, the organization of the
literary market, and the commercial opportunities beckoning to history writers.
During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it was not unusual for
prominent historians to move in and out of universities. They imagined
themselves as independent ‘men of letters’, cultivating the ideal of gentlemanly
amateurism while simultaneously making money by satisfying the demands of
a growing middle-class readership. Eminent scholars such as E. H. Carr and
E. P. Thompson only spent a part of their professional lives within ivory towers
and the rest as freelance writers, newspaper editors, or diplomats. Careers like
theirs, which were very unusual in French higher education and virtually non-
existent in German universities at the time, served as an antidote to the
ossiﬁcation of academic historiography. Today, border crossers resisting the
dictates of academic professionalization are a rare sight at British universities,
too, though there still are a few prominent examples, such as Noel Malcolm at
Oxford University or William St Clair at Cambridge. Still, many historians
with purely academic careers have so far stuck to the tradition of writing for
professional and lay audiences alike, and one motivation to do so has been the
continuing possibility to enhance a modest academic salary with considerable
revenue from publications.
In fact, with Andrew Wylie and other literary agents adding senior faculty staff
to their list of ‘highbrow’ authors and marketing these authors with ‘lowbrow’
methods on a global scale, some academic historians are now able to pocket
advance payments that would have made previous generations of ‘men of
letters’ blush – or turn them green with envy. I do not think that there are
academic historians on the continent who have an agent, let alone secure large
advances for book contracts, but I might be wrong, because if there are any, they
probably would not let anybody know for fear of the persistently powerful
prejudice that commercial success is a sign of intellectual failure.
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To get a full picture of how public historians in Britain survived in the role of
‘men of letters’ by conforming to gentlemanly ideals of wit and style and
turning them into commercial success, one has to reach for the book of a
literary scholar who himself combines many features of this role. This is Common
reading: critics, historians, publics by Stefan Collini. The book consists of two
dozen short essays, most of which were written on the occasion of a book review
and ﬁrst published in the Times Literary Supplement or the London Review of Books.
More than half deal with a single literary critic, public philosopher, or historian;
the rest is devoted to more general topics such as ‘The author as celebrity’ or
‘The literary critic as hero’. Among the historians selected by Collini are ﬁgures
as diverse as Arthur Bryant and Perry Anderson, E. P. Thompson and Herbert
Butterﬁeld.
E. H. Carr appears once again, portrayed by Collini as an anti-intellectual
intellectual, a popular role in twentieth-century England, though more on the
right than, as in Carr’s case, among sympathizers with Soviet Russia. Carr’s self-
image as an outsider in all camps, cultivated with the necessary moderation and
panache, partly explains his appeal to broad audiences. He behaved as a realist
among academics, as an intellectual among diplomats, and as a Russophile
among Cold Warriors. His preaching of ‘realism’ and damning of ‘illusion’ had,
Collini writes, the paradoxical effect that ‘he tended to underestimate the role
of ideology in determining Soviet policy, just as he had in the case of Nazi
Germany in the late s. His devotion to Realpolitik thus turned out to be in
this respect unrealistic, a failure accurately to register the actual moving forces
in world affairs’ (p. ). Collini also detects ‘a streak of soured romanticism’ in
Carr’s commitment to ‘realism’, which he sees expressed in the regret that the
future did not look as bright anymore to Carr as it had looked to the British of
the nineteenth century (p. ).
What makes Collini’s portraits so rich, apart from his subtle and precise
prose, is his sense of scholarly self-contradictions and his ability to describe
them as a source of both ideological blind spots and literary productivity.
Naturally, this sense bears richer fruit when Collini deals with authors of a
certain intellectual calibre. Arthur Bryant, devotee to ‘the historic and eternal
English vision’, ﬁghter of England’s hereditary enemies (‘intellectuals’, ‘dons’,
‘highbrows’, ‘secularists’, ‘progressives’), friend of the ‘good ordinary
Englishmen’, and best-selling ‘man of letters’, cannot offer much more than a
picture of piled-up anachronisms:
the ﬁgure whom Britain’s cultural and political establishment had gathered to
honour in Westminster Abbey in the s had sustained into the s a relation
with a public deﬁned in the s and s while writing in the manner and with
the conﬁdence of an Edwardian man of letter who in turn was striving to emulate the
achievements of Victorian historians. (p. )
 Stefan Collini, Common reading: critics, historians, publics (Oxford, ).
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More rewarding is Collini’s portrait of Perry Anderson as a Marxist of
aristocratic grandeur. Collini does not hide his admiration for the man. ‘It
hardly seems fair’, he writes about a collection of Anderson’s essays (with
obvious similarities to his own anthology), ‘that one man could move with such
ease through the history of so many periods and regions or through so many
different kinds of writing’ (p. ). This, however, does not prevent him from
describing Anderson as a person sharing many traits with British ‘men of letters’
on the conservative side. Despite his cosmopolitan ﬂair and polyglot virtuosity,
Anderson appears as a distinctively British intellectual – an upper-middle-
class rebel adhering, in his own words, to the principle that ‘writing well is the
best revenge’ and displaying a gentlemanly disdain for ‘institutions of higher
learning’ with their ‘pretentious jargons, guild conceit’ and ‘standards of
writing that would have left Marx and Morris speechless’ (p. ). Anderson’s
fear that the migration of his comrades into universities would cripple the
intellectual power and aesthetic prowess of the left was followed by himself
taking up a distinguished chair at UCLA (though part-time only), and with the
Marxist movement in the West driven to the margins of the intellectual
spectrum, Collini cannot help asking which readership Anderson is addressing
himself to with his reﬁned English that comes decorated with pieces of German,
Latin, and French. The answer remains vague, but Collini’s ﬁnal conclusion
comes surprisingly close to that on Arthur Bryant – with a small, but crucial
distinction: while Bryant was outmoded, Anderson is and has always been
‘untimely’, an aristocratic mind deriving his relentless intellectual energy
from an eighteenth-century code of honour that ‘scoundrels should not be
allowed to get away without, at the very least, a good thrashing’ (p. ). If this is
so, then Anderson must feel very much at home in our post-neo-liberal era of
neo-liberalism.
And what about Collini himself? Whom does he write for, for what purpose
and from what position? The answer may be even more difﬁcult than in
Anderson’s case. It is fascinating, but also irritating to see that Collini, in much
of his work, revolves around the public role aspired for and attributed to British
intellectuals without ever making himself, at least to my knowledge, a part of the
story he tells. Many critics of his books have been desperate to pin him down,
with little success so far. Terry Eagleton, in a review of Collini’s Absent minds:
intellectuals in Britain, thought to have found ‘an enormous blind spot’, that is
the ‘critique of its own modern-day, middle-class liberalism’. The study, he
criticized, dished out even-handedly to the left and right and thus stood ‘where
we all instinctively, corporeally imagine we are: bang in the middle’. In
Eagleton’s eyes, of course, the middle is a no-go area in a double sense. It is way
too far to the right and no place for committed scholarship. With Collini
becoming a prominent voice against the commercialization of higher education
 Terry Eagleton, ‘The truth speakers’, New Statesman,  Apr. : www.newstatesman.
com/.
 H I S TO R I C A L J O U R N A L
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0018246X12000337
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 07:20:23, subject to the Cambridge Core
in recent years, the reproach of lacking commitment may not stick very well
anymore, while the political left–right spectrum just seems more obsolete a
classiﬁcation than ever.
And, still, the question about Collini’s public position and self-perception
continues to loom large. When E. P. Thompson thought in the early s
that commerce had taken its grip on academic life, he left the University of
Warwick in protest and became a political campaigner and freelance writer. It
seems that Collini has never ﬂirted with such a drastic reaction to the state-run
pseudo-commercialization of higher education. Instead, he turned himself into
a staunch defender of the university as a bastion of intellectual curiosity,
independent from the dictates of commerce and politics. This is obviously a
vision of the university from a humanities department, and by drawing a clear
demarcation line between academic and economic rules, Collini risks blinding
out the forces of commercialization within the university, be it the willingness of
scholars to be promoted by literary agents or the eagerness of scientists to be
funded with corporate money (which then also helps to cross-subsidize the
humanities, especially in places like Cambridge). Sparing his colleagues in
college, but not the scoundrels in government, Collini becomes an ‘untimely’
thinker himself, treasuring an institutional heritage that may have been given
up long ago. Ultimately, his presentation of the university as a unique and
privileged place of intellectual endeavour implies, perhaps against his own
intention, the clearest renunciation so far of the role of the ‘man of letters’, as
played by British scholars, whose trademark has been to treat the university as
one of many mind-narrowing establishments and to associate intellectual
independence with a lack of institutional allegiance. Is now the time, after
decades of premature announcements, to issue a death certiﬁcate to that
tenacious survivor of the early modern period? Not necessarily. With the
humanistic academic becoming a stranger in his own house, the British man of
letters may see yet another new spring – in timely fashion.
 For Collini’s contributions to the recent debate on higher education, see now hisWhat are
universities for? (London, ).
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